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Abstract
Recent research demonstrates that response inhibition—a core executive function—may subserve self-regulation and self-
control. However, it is unclear whether response inhibition also predicts self-control in the multifaceted, high-level
phenomena of social decision-making. Here we examined whether electrophysiological indices of response inhibition
would predict self-control in a social context. Electroencephalography was recorded as participants completed a widely
used Go/NoGo task (the cued Continuous Performance Test). Participants then interacted with a partner in an economic
exchange game that requires self-control. Results demonstrated that greater NoGo-Anteriorization and larger NoGo-P300
peak amplitudes—two established electrophysiological indices of response inhibition—both predicted more self-control in
this social game. These findings support continued integration of executive function and self-regulation and help extend
prior research into social decision-making processes.
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Introduction
Executive functions are cognitive mechanisms that direct the
dynamics of thought and action [1]. Core functions include a
working memory component that holds and updates relevant
information, a set shifting component that allows switching
between tasks or information sets, and a response inhibition
component that acts as the brake on dominant, automatic, or
prepotent behavior [2]. Intriguingly, research has begun to reveal
that these fundamental executive functions may subserve broad
self-regulation and self-control processes [3]. For example,
working memory capacity predicts regulation of anger and
resistance to tempting stimuli [4] and response inhibition predicts
better control of smoking behavior [5]. Essentially, these putatively
‘cool’ executive functions appear to interface with ‘hot’ motiva-
tional processes. A key question remains. Do basic executive
functions like response inhibition also predict self-regulation and
self-control in social decision-making?
In comparison to reigning in a motor-response or resisting a
tempting snack, however, self-control in social decision-making is
much more complex. The goals or impulses are abstract (e.g.,
goals that comply with social norms or goals that promote personal
achievement) and social decisions often require consideration of
another’s mental state (i.e., theory of mind, [6]). It is thus
questionable that response inhibition also predicts self-control in
such a multifaceted, high-level phenomenon as social decision-
making. Preliminary research suggests that it may. In one study,
performance on a stop-signal task predicted strategic responding in
an ultimatum game [7]. However, reaction time tasks are not
direct measures of ongoing response inhibition processes (i.e., there
is no response to index). As such, we utilized electroencephalog-
raphy (EEG) to examine whether neural activity associated with
response inhibition would predict complex decision-making in a
social game that would require self-control.
We employed an economic exchange game with real, monetary
consequences (referred to as a broken promise game). In this
paradigm, participants promised whether or not they would return
money to ostensibly real partners, but were later given the
opportunity to break that promise. Critical to understanding
whether a response requires self-control is whether or not a
prepotent impulse must be inhibited at the decision point [8]. We
designed the game in such a way that the prepotent response was
to follow through with the promise to return money. Thus, the
response that required self-control was breaking the promise.
Importantly, this notion has empirical support. In a functional
magnetic resonance imaging study, breaking a promise was
associated with increased activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (PFC) and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), among
other regions, suggesting that participants recruited these control-
related regions to inhibit the promised response to return money
[9].
To index response inhibition processes, we measured two
established electrophysiological indices based on the P300 event-
related potential (ERP) during a Go/NoGo task called the cued
Continuous Performance Test (CPT). The NoGo-P300 potential is
known to peak over fronto-central electrodes at approximately 300
to 500 ms after stimulus presentation [10]. From this ERP, we
calculated both the NoGo Anteriorization (NGA, [11]) and peak
amplitude of the NoGo-P300. The NGA is a comparison of EEG
topographical maps between NoGo- and Go-ERPs at the P300
peak after stimulus presentation (e.g., [11]). The NoGo-ERPs
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consistently show a forward-shift or ‘anteriorization’ of the positive
centroid (i.e., the ‘center of gravity’ of the positive electrical field
on the scalp). Higher NGA values are thought to reflect increased
frontal activation recruited to control or inhibit the prepotent
motor-response. Indeed, the NGA is reduced in patients charac-
terized by a ‘disinhibited’ pathology, including attention deficit/
hyperactivity disorder, schizophrenia, genetic risk alleles, and
22q11.2 deletion syndrome [12–16]. Additionally, increased NGA
has been associated with increased baseline activation in lateral
PFC regions associated with response inhibition and cognitive
control [17]. The NoGo-P300 peak amplitude, like the NGA, is
thought to specifically reflect response inhibition [18,19]. For
example, the NoGo-P300 is elicited by both motor and cognitive
inhibition and its amplitude is sensitive to increased inhibitory load
or demand [19,20]. NoGo-P300 peak amplitude has also been
related to pathologies characterized by impulsivity [21].
We expected that response inhibition processes would predict
self-control in a social context. In the broken promise paradigm,
the prepotent response to be inhibited at the decision point was
following through with the promise to return an investment.
Breaking the promise thus required self-control. Consequently, we
hypothesized that a larger NGA and larger NoGo-P300 peak
amplitudes would both predict the degree to which participants
broke their promises. Further, we examined whether source-
localized neural activity specific to response inhibition would also
be associated with the degree to which participants broke their
promises.
Methods
Ethics Statement
This study was approved by the Ethikkommission Beider Basel
(EKBB) of the University of Basel. All subjects gave written
informed consent before the study.
Participants and Procedure
In the first of two sessions, 45 right-handed participants (age
M=23.58, SD=5.01; 26 females, years of education M=16.86,
SD=2.83) each completed the CPT during which EEG was
recorded. All subjects were screened for health problems with a
detailed questionnaire. They had no current or prior history of
neurological or psychiatric disorder and no history of alcohol or
drug abuse. Note that one person was excluded from analyses
based on outlier NGA data and regression influence statistics
(Cook’s Distance =0.67, over 8 times larger than the next highest
value), leaving 44 participants for analyses. Participants completed
the broken promise game in a second session in small groups on
separate computers. Subjects received 40 Swiss francs (CHF 40;
CHF 1 , $1 U.S.) compensation for participating, in addition to
money earned in the broken promise game.
Response Inhibition Task: Cued Continuous Performance
Test (CPT)
To elicit response inhibition, we utilized the CPT [22,23]. In
this task, participants prepare and implement a speeded button
press to particular ‘target’ stimuli and inhibit the prepared
response to ‘non-target’ stimuli. Letters were presented centrally
on a computer screen one letter at a time for 200 ms (inter-
stimulus interval: 1650 ms) in a pseudo-randomized order. Before
the task, participants were instructed to press the response button
on ‘Go’-trials—a paired sequence of stimuli in which the letter O
(a primer stimuli) was first presented then followed by the letter X
(a target stimulus). On ‘NoGo’-trials, participants were instructed
to not respond when the letter O was followed by any letter other
than X (a non-target stimulus). Participants were finally instructed
to give their answers as quickly and as accurately as possible. The
stimulus set consisted of 400 trials (with 12 different letters: A, B,
C, D, E, F, G, H, J, L, O, X), of which 80 were primer stimuli, 40
were target stimuli, and 40 were non-target stimuli. The remaining
stimuli were 240 distractor letters (letters other than O, or an X
without a preceding O). Because target and non-target stimuli are
equally probable, the comparison of brain responses between
NoGo- and Go-stimuli is not confounded by oddball or frequency
of stimuli effects [24,25], allowing us to directly examine the
electrophysiology of inhibiting versus executing a motor response.
Electrophysiological Measurement
Continuous EEG was recorded from 64 Ag-AgCl active
electrodes positioned according to the 10/10 system montage
[26]. EEG was sampled at 512 Hz (24 bit precision; bandwidth:
0.1–100 Hz) and was referenced to common mode sense with a
driven right leg ground. Horizontal and vertical electro-oculo-
graphic signals were recorded with electrodes at the left and right
outer canthi and left infraorbital muscle. Eye-movement artifacts
were corrected by independent component analysis. EEG signals
from channels with corrupted signals were interpolated.
Event-Related Potentials Processing: NGA and P300
EEG data from the CPT were first filtered offline with a
bandpass from 0.1 to 30 Hz. An automatic artifact detection
within an epoch of 200 ms before to 1000 ms after stimulus
presentation marked amplitudes greater than 70 mV. Data were
then visually inspected to detect any residual artifacts. All available
artifact-free EEG epochs from correct responses were segmented,
re-referenced (to an average reference of all electrodes), baseline
corrected (using a -200 ms - 0 ms pre-stimulus window as baseline),
and individually averaged to Go- and NoGo-ERPs (number of
artifact-free Go-epochs: M=34.30, SD=4.40; number of artifact-
free NoGo-epochs: M=33.70, SD=5.11). All subjects had a
minimum of 20 artifact-free and correct-response Go- and NoGo-
epochs.
P300 peak latencies were defined at the electrode with the most
positive deflection; Pz for Go-trials (240–484 ms) and Cz for
NoGo-trials (304–444 ms). Time windows were derived from the
P300 microstates (quantifiable time periods of relatively stable
electric field configurations, for further explanation of the
methodology see [27]). Go- and NoGo-P300 peak amplitudes
were then indexed at the respective peak latency from all
electrodes for each subject.
To calculate the NGA, positive area centroids of P300 field
maps [28] were calculated at each individual’s P300 peak for both
Go- and NoGo-ERPs. The location of each individual Go- and
NoGo-positive centroid was determined by fitting or projecting the
electrode array from the scalp onto a rectangular coordinate
system. Positive centroid locations were measured on an anterior-
posterior scale ranging from 1 (position of the electrode Fpz) to 9
(position of Oz; see Figure 1). Smaller values thus indicate a more
anterior centroid. The NGA was calculated for each subject as the
difference between Go- and NoGo-positive centroids on this
anterior-posterior axis [11] such that more positive numbers
indicate a larger NGA.
Source Localization of Inhibition-Related Neural Activity
We utilized standardized low-resolution brain electromagnetic
tomography (sLORETA; [29]) to estimate intracerebral activation
during response inhibition in the CPT. sLORETA computes
electric neuronal activity as current density (A/m2) without
assuming a predefined number of active sources. The sLORETA
NGA and NoGo-P300 Predict Social Self-Control
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solution space consists of 6,239 voxels (voxel size: 56565 mm)
and is restricted to cortical gray matter and hippocampi, as defined
by the digitized Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) probability
atlas. Using the option automatic regularization method in the
sLORETA software, we chose the transformation matrix with the
signal-to-noise set to 10.
Specifically, we wished to identify brain regions that signifi-
cantly contributed to the NGA and NoGo-P300. Thus, sLOR-
ETA images were computed at individual P300 peaks for Go- and
NoGo-conditions, respectively. To reduce confounds that have no
regional specificity, for each subject and for each condition,
sLORETA images were normalized to a total power of one and
then log-transformed before statistical analyses.
Broken Promise Game
We adapted a basic trust game in which two players, interacting
anonymously, played the roles of an investor (Player A) and a
trustee (Player B). Our subjects were always in the role of Player B.
Player B first makes a ‘promise’ at the beginning of three
subsequent game trials, indicating whether he or she will ‘never’,
‘sometimes’, ‘mostly’ or ‘always’ (given the values from 0-3,
respectively) return Player A’s investment. At the start of a single
trial, Player A is informed about Player B’s promise level and
decides whether to invest money (2 money units, MUs) or not. If
Player A does invest, MUs are increased fivefold (10 MUs). Player
B then decides to either send back half (5 MUs) or keep the full
amount (MUs were exchanged at the end of the study for real
money, 1 MU = CHF 1/5). Thus, Player B can either keep his or
her promise or break it. The experiment consisted of 9 trials with
three promise decisions from Player B preceding three subsequent
trials. Player B thus played in 9 separate trials with 9 different,
anonymous, and randomly selected interaction partners. We
report the average promise level of the three promise decisions and
the average investment return rate across all return decisions.
A Broken Promise score was then calculated as the ratio of
investment return level (number of returns/number of investments
from Player A) to promise level (sum of promise values/9 [i.e.,
total possible sum of promise values]). This variable was then
reflected and standardized for easier interpretation and plotting,
such that a higher number indicates that the person returned
proportionately less in comparison to promise levels, whereas a
lower number indicates that the person returned proportionately
more in comparison to promise levels.
Statistical Analyses
To examine whether self-control in social decision-making is
related to response inhibition we entered the Broken Promise score
into separate Pearson correlations with both the NGA and the
NoGo-P300 peak amplitude. We also correlated both the Go- and
NoGo-positive centroid positions with the Broken Promise score to
further corroborate that it is a shift towards frontal regions in the
NoGo-ERP that is associated with self-control in this task.
Additionally, because the NoGo-P300 peak amplitude is maximal
at fronto-central electrodes, we restricted our analyses to the
following central-midline positions for NoGo-P300 peak ampli-
tudes: CPz, Cz (the maximal peak in these data), and FCz.
Figure 1. Relationship between the Broken Promise score and the NGA. A. Scalp field maps showing the positive centroid position on an
anterior posterior axis (from 1= most anterior, to 9 = most posterior) in the Go- (left panel) and NoGo-ERPs (right panel). The NGA was calculated as
the Go-positive centroid position minus NoGo-positive centroid position (middle panel). B. Scatterplots of the correlations between the standardized
Broken Promise score (i.e., larger numbers indicate a higher ratio of broken promises) and the Go-positive centroid (left), the NGA (middle), and the
NoGo-positive centroid (right).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0079462.g001
NGA and NoGo-P300 Predict Social Self-Control
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Lastly, we examined whether source-localized brain activity
related to response inhibition was associated with the Broken
Promise score. We contrasted the sLORETA images of the NoGo-
versus Go-condition at individual P300 peaks and regressed this
contrast on the Broken Promise score. As it has been consistently
shown that frontocingulate regions encompassing the lateral PFC
and ACC are more active during the NoGo- compared with the
Go-condition [30–32], we restricted this voxel-by-voxel regression
analysis to all voxels encompassing prefrontal regions (Brodmann
areas [BAs] 8, 9, 10, 11, 44, 45, 46, and 47; 1331 voxels) and
anterior cingulate regions (BAs 24, 32, and 33; 313 voxels).
Correction for multiple testing (for all voxels of the frontocingulate
regions) was implemented by means of a nonparametric random-
ization approach [33]. The nonparametric randomization ap-
proach was used to estimate empirical probability distributions
and the corresponding corrected (for multiple comparisons) critical
probability thresholds.
Results
In the CPT, participants made an average of 0.89 (SD=0.95)
errors, whereas the modal error total was 0. More specifically,
participants made, on average, 0.48 (SD=0.82) omission errors
(no response to Go-stimuli) and 0.41 (SD=0.58) commission errors
(incorrect response to any stimuli other than Go-stimuli). Average
reaction time to Go-stimuli was 389.86 ms (SD=84.79). Consis-
tent with prior research on the NGA [22], topographical analysis
revealed that the positive centroid was more anterior in the NoGo-
ERP (coordinate position M=5.10, SD=0.65) compared to the
Go-ERP (coordinate position M=6.72, SD=0.50; t(43) = 17.62, p
,0.001, see Figure 1).
Examination of behavior in the broken promise game revealed
that even though participants reported very high promise levels
(M=2.61, SD=0.50; 54% chose ‘3 - always’ to return the
investment for each promise round, and 93% chose at least ‘2 -
almost always’ for each round [i.e., chose a value of 2 or higher]),
there was considerable variability in actual investment return
Figure 2. Relationship between the Broken Promise score and the NoGo-P300 amplitudes. A. Approximate scalp position of the
electrodes used for the NoGo-P300 peak amplitude, FCz, Cz, CPz. B. Plot of the NoGo-ERPs (stimulus presentation at 0 ms). C. Scatterplots of the
correlation between the Broken Promise score (i.e., larger numbers indicate a higher ratio of broken promises) and the NoGo-P300 peak amplitudes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0079462.g002
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levels (return rate: M=51%, SD=35%). The most frequent return
rate was to return nothing in all rounds (21%), whereas the next
most frequent return rate was to always return the investment
(18%). Thus, there was a high degree of variance in deceptive
behavior (similar to prior results, [9]). We also examined whether
decision times differed between breaking a promise and keeping a
promise. As in prior research on decision times, we focused on the
first decision to minimize in-game learning and interaction history
effects (e.g., [34]). A one-way ANOVA revealed that people who
broke their promise on the first decision displayed longer decision
times (M=6.08 s, SD=3.41) than people who kept their promise
(M=4.22 s, SD=0.92), F(1, 39) = 7.58, p,0.01. Thus, breaking a
promise required the most time, indicative of increased deliber-
ation and self-control [35].
In our primary analyses, we examined correlations of the NGA
and the NoGo-P300 peak amplitude with the Broken Promise
score. In support of our prediction that neural markers of the
executive function response inhibition would predict self-control in
social decision-making, the NGA was significantly related to the
Broken Promise score. That is, greater NGA values were
associated with a higher Broken Promise score, r(42) = 0.41,
p,0.01. Moreover, this correlation appears attributable primarily
to the NoGo-positive centroid position (r(42) = –0.38, p,0.05) and
not the Go-positive centroid position (r(42) = 0.01), indicating that
the Broken Promise score was correlated with a more anterior
NoGo-positive centroid as opposed to a more posterior Go-
positive centroid (note that the correlation is negative here because
the coordinate system ranges from 1 – most anterior to 9 – most
posterior, see Figure 1). This directly refutes the notion that the
NGA-Broken Promise correlation is due to processes in the Go-
condition. Moreover, much like the NGA finding, NoGo-P300
peak amplitude was also correlated with the Broken Promise score;
at FCz, r(42) = 0.31, p,0.05; at Cz, r(42) = 0.32, p,0.05; at CPz,
r(42) = 0.31, p,0.05 (see Figure 2). Thus, two different
electrophysiological indices of response inhibition were associated
with the Broken Promise score.
Finally, source-localization analysis showed that higher Broken
Promise scores were associated with greater activation during
response inhibition in the medial PFC/ACC, cluster average r(42) =
0.59, p,0.001 (BAs 9, 10, and 32, peak voxel: MNI [x, y, z] 25,
40, 25, see Figure 3A), and the right lateral PFC, cluster average r(42)
= 0.52, p,0.001 (BA 8, peak voxel: MNI [x, y, z] 25, 30, 45, see
Figure 3B). Consistent with the NGA and NoGo-P300 scalp
results, the source-localized brain activity specifically related to
response inhibition was associated with the Broken Promise score.
Figure 3. Relationship between the Broken Promise score and source-localized brain activity related to response inhibition. In the
first two panels on the left, locations of the voxels that showed significant correlations are indicated in red (p,0.05, corrected) and, on the right,
scatterplots are shown demonstrating the relationship between the Broken Promise score and source-localized brain activity (i.e., demonstrating the
average correlation across all voxels that exceeded the corrected p threshold in the same cluster). We found significant positive correlations between
the Broken Promise score and current density in the medial PFC/ACC (A; BAs 9, 10, and 32, peak voxel at MNI [x, y, z] –5, 40, 25), and in the lateral PFC
(B; BA 8, peak voxel at MNI [x, y, z] 25, 30, 45).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0079462.g003
NGA and NoGo-P300 Predict Social Self-Control
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That is, neural markers of motor-response control predicted self-
control in a complex social context.
Discussion
Recent research has demonstrated that executive functions are
involved in self-regulation and self-control [3]. However, a direct
link between executive functions and self-control in social decision-
making has rarely been demonstrated [36]. Here we examined
whether electrophysiological indices of response inhibition would
predict controlled behavior in a social decision-making task. We
found that the NGA, NoGo-P300 peak amplitude, and response
inhibition-related brain activity all predicted self-control in an
economic exchange game. Moreover, the activation that was
associated with the Broken Promise score was source-localized to
medial PFC/ACC and lateral PFC, brain regions that are both
thought to be involved in self-control across a variety of domains
[37–40]. This study thus provides some of the first evidence that
directly connects non-social with social forms of self-control.
One might suggest that the Broken Promise score reflects the
reverse effect—a lack of self-control. That is, the prepotent
response would be selfish, monetary gain and the score reflects a
failure to inhibit this greedy impulse. We think this interpretation
is unlikely for several reasons. First, past research shows that
breaking a promise (specifically in this paradigm), as compared to
keeping a promise, activates self-control related brain areas,
namely medial PFC/ACC and lateral PFC regions [9]. Second,
we assessed two established yet separable electrophysiological
indices of response inhibition—the NGA and the NoGo-P300
peak amplitude—as well response inhibition-related brain activity.
We supplement these findings by analyzing reaction time to Go-
trials. Past research has inferred better response inhibition
processes from faster reaction times to Go-stimuli [41,42]. In the
current research, much like the NGA and the NoGo-P300 peak
amplitude, faster Go-trial reaction times were related to higher
Broken Promise scores, r(42) = –0.27, p,0.08. Thus, four separate
indices linked to response inhibition—three electrophysiological
and one behavioral—were associated with the Broken Promise
score in the same direction. If the Broken promise score did reflect
a lack of self-control, one would expect the opposite effects, not the
effects we found. Third, we demonstrated that breaking a promise
required the most time, indicative of increased deliberation and
self-control. These points all converge to support our theoretical
assertion that a higher Broken Promise score reflects more self-
control.
These results have implications for prior evidence that self-
control involves a core process. For example, self-control in one
domain can impact self-control in subsequent, unrelated domains
[5,43]. Self-control is relatively stable from childhood to adulthood
across a variety of situations [44]. A number of psychopathological
disorders are attributed to disrupted impulse control [45–47]. The
inhibition of motor responses, emotions, desires, and cognitions
reliably involves similar brain regions (for a recent review, see
[40]). Because response inhibition measures also predict self-
control across various domains, including delaying gratification,
thought inhibition, emotion suppression [3,44], and now social
decision-making, perhaps the core process of self-control is the
executive function of response inhibition? Further, these findings
are consistent with studies that examine response inhibition
processes and psychopathological disorders characterized by
impulsivity [45]. As these disorders often co-occur with social
difficulties [47], our results corroborate the notion that the
disruption of executive functions may produce social deficits [46].
More broadly, meaningful communication between the cogni-
tive and social psychological literatures on self-regulation has been
lacking until relatively recently [3]. The current research
supplements the notion that this burgeoning, integrative perspec-
tive on self-regulation can unite and strengthen these separate
paradigms. Drawing on both cognitive and social psychological
literatures hints at intriguing new research avenues. For example,
a considerable amount of social psychological research indicates
that self-control can be temporarily reduced and such reductions
may be due to impairment of executive functioning [36,48]. Based
on the current results, prospective research could explore whether
impaired or disrupted executive functioning predicts impaired self-
control in other, high-level social contexts. Alternatively, training
manipulations that boost executive functioning over the long-term
[49,50] could potentially promote lasting improvements in the
regulation of social behavior.
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